In May 2019, an international conference on perinatal palliative care entitled “Yes to Life! Taking Care of the Precious Gift of Life in Its Frailty” was held in Rome. It was organized by the Italian nonprofit foundation Il Cuore in Una Goccia and the Vatican’s Dicastery for Laity, Family and Life. Pope Francis greeted the participants personally and delivered an address describing the goals and practices of perinatal palliative care as being in keeping with the teachings of the Roman Catholic (...) Church and the pastoral care of families. His endorsement represents a new pastoral development, a renewed focus on supporting families and infants who are affected by genetic... (shrink)

We have synthesized a 582,970-base pair Mycoplasma genitalium genome. This synthetic genome, named M. genitalium JCVI-1.0, contains all the genes of wild-type M. genitalium G37 except MG408, which was disrupted by an antibiotic marker to block pathogenicity and to allow for selection. To identify the genome as synthetic, we inserted "watermarks" at intergenic sites known to tolerate transposon insertions. Overlapping "cassettes" of 5 to 7 kilobases (kb), assembled from chemically synthesized oligonucleotides, were joined by in vitro recombination to produce intermediate (...) assemblies of approximately 24 kb, 72 kb ("1/8 genome"), and 144 kb ("1/4 genome"), which were all cloned as bacterial artificial chromosomes in Escherichia coli. Most of these intermediate clones were sequenced, and clones of all four 1/4 genomes with the correct sequence were identified. The complete synthetic genome was assembled by transformation-associated recombination cloning in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, then isolated and sequenced. A clone with the correct sequence was identified. The methods described here will be generally useful for constructing large DNA molecules from chemically synthesized pieces and also from combinations of natural and synthetic DNA segments. 10.1126/science.1151721. (shrink)

Die sog. "Schwarzen Hefte" haben umfassender und deutlicher als je zuvor die Verbindungen zwischen Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger sichtbar werden lassen und damit eine neue Debatte uber den Rang dieses Denkens entfacht. DEnn die dort enthaltenen Texte demonstrieren, dass Philosophie, Metapolitik und Politik bei Heidegger eine Einheit bilden, zu der die Befurwortung des Nationalsozialismus und der Antisemitismus gehoren. INs Zentrum der kritischen Revision ruckt das erste Hauptwerk von 1927, "Sein und Zeit", das nahezu unangefochten als epochaler Beitrag zur Philosophie (...) des 20. JAhrhunderts gilt. DIe "Schwarzen Hefte" fordern eine "Destruktion" dieses Werks auch insofern heraus, als die dort prasentierten Selbstinterpretationen das philosophische Profil dieses Denkens scharfen und neue Gesichtspunkte fur die Diskussion seiner Substanz im philosophischen und ideologischen Kontext des 20. JAhrhunderts eroffnen. 90 Jahre nach seinem Erscheinen stellt sich der philosophischen Forschung die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit" als unabweisbare Aufgabe. IM Vordergrund stehen hierbei zwei Fragen: Wie ist das Unternehmen einer in der "Fundamentalontologie" des Daseins begrundeten temporalen Ontologie der systematischen Intention und Durchfuhrung fachphilosophisch zu beurteilen? Beinhalten die ausgearbeiteten Teile bereits gedankliche Prafigurationen oder Grundlagen fur Heideggers Antisemitismus und Nationalsozialismus? Der Band behandelt diese Problemstellungen aus unterschiedlichen philosophischen, aber auch disziplinaren Perspektiven; er enthalt Beitrage von Charles Bambach, William Blattner, Christoph Demmerling, Emmanuel Faye, Anton M. FIscher, Johannes Fritsche, Hassan Givsan, Marion Heinz, Christoph Jamme, Sidonie Kellerer, Rainer Marten, Daniel Meyer, Livia Profeti, Tom Rockmore und Dieter Thoma. (shrink)

Many analyses of notion of _metainferences_ in the non-transitive logic ST have tackled the question of whether ST can be identified with classical logic. In this paper, we argue that the primary analyses are overly restrictive of the notion of metainference. We offer a more elegant and tractable semantics for the strict-tolerant hierarchy based on the three-valued function for the LP material conditional. This semantics can be shown to easily handle the introduction of _mixed_ inferences, _i.e._, inferences involving objects belonging (...) to more than one (meta)inferential level and solves several other limitations of the ST hierarchies introduced by Barrio, Pailos, and Szmuc. (shrink)

I argue that Diego Alvarez and Thomas de Lemos through their participation in the De auxiliis controversy developed and defended Cajetan’s view of the causation of sin in such a way that they were able to defend the predetermination of the material aspect of sin while at the same time assimilating important aspects from his critics. It is important to recognize that Lemos and his associates hold both that the premotion of sin’s material aspect is not necessarily connected with (...) the Catholic faith and that it is knowable by natural reason. Even though they argued that other Molinist theses should be condemned as heretical, they held that this rejection of the Dominican thesis concerning sin is simply wrong but not heretical. First, I consider Cajetan’s position. Second, I consider the reception of this position by Medina, Zumel, and Báñez. Third, I show that Alvarez and Lemos make distinctions that allow them to incorporate the insights of both Cajetan and his critics. (shrink)

This paper is reprinted in the book Machine Ethics, eds. M. Anderson and S. Anderson, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; (...) given the weak construal, internalism is unmotivated; either way, internalism is in serious trouble. I argue for two claims in this article. First, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unmotivated: he’s given no good reason for accepting one of its crucial premises. And second, Bergmann’s dilemma argument is unsound: the crucial premise in question is false. (shrink)

AbstractExtant research has demonstrated that underdog expectations—individuals’ perceptions that others view them as unlikely to succeed—can have positive implications for motivating performance. In this paper, we draw on self-determination theory to examine how and when underdog expectations can have detrimental consequences for both the employee and the organization. Specifically, we propose that underdog expectations can decrease employees’ need fulfillment, which in turn leads to more cheating behavior. Furthermore, we theorize that the indirect effect of underdog expectations on cheating behavior via (...) need fulfillment is weaker when general self-efficacy is high than when it is low. Results from two studies using complementary designs support our predictions. Overall, our research demonstrates a potential dark side to underdog expectations and also contributes to the behavioral ethics literature. (shrink)

In his ethical writings, Duns Scotus emphasized both divine freedom and natural goodness, and these seem to conflict with each other in various ways. I offer an interpretation of Scotus which takes seriously these twin emphases and shows how they cohere. I argue that, for Scotus, all natural laws obtain just by the natures of actual things. Divine commands, such as the Ten Commandments, contingently track natural laws but do not make natural laws to be natural laws. I present textual (...) evidence for this claim. I also show how this view of Scotus on the natural law is consistent with a number of troubling passages. Scotus’s ethical theory implies that there are genuinely moral reasons for acting which are not absolutely binding (because subject to a divine command or permission otherwise) and also some moral reasons for acting which are absolutely binding (because not thus subject). (shrink)

This volume commemorates the 6th centennial of the birth of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), a Renaissance polymath whose interests included law, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, theology, mysticism and relations between Christians and non-Christian peoples. The contributors to this volume reflect Cusanus' multiple interests; and, by doing so they commemorate three deceased luminaries of the American Cusanus Society: F. Edward Cranz, Thomas P. McTighe and Charles Trinkaus. Contributors include: Christopher M. Bellitto, H. Lawrence Bond, Elizabeth Brient, Louis Dupré, Wilhelm Dupré, Walter (...) Andreas Euler, Lawrence Hundersmarck, Thomas M. Izbicki, Dennis D. Martin, Yelena Matusevich, Bernard McGinn, Clyde Lee Miller, Thomas E. Morrissey, Brian A. Pavlac, and Morimichi Watanabe. Publications by Charles Trinkaus: - Edited by C. Trinkaus and H.A. Oberman, The pursuit of holiness in late medieval and renaissance religion, ISBN: 978 90 04 03791 5 (Out of print). (shrink)

Can computer systems ever be considered moral agents? This paper considers two factors that are explored in the recent philosophical literature. First, there are the important domains in which computers are allowed to act, made possible by their greater functional capacities. Second, there is the claim that these functional capacities appear to embody relevant human abilities, such as autonomy and responsibility. I argue that neither the first (Domain-Function) factor nor the second (Simulacrum) factor gets at the central issue in the (...) case for computer moral agency: whether they can have the kinds of intentional states that cause their decisions and actions. I give an account that builds on traditional action theory and allows us to conceive of computers as genuine moral agents in virtue of their own causally efficacious intentional states. These states can cause harm or benefit to moral patients, but do not depend on computer consciousness or intelligence. (shrink)

Georg Simmel, as well as being a major philosopher, is one of the founding figures of sociology whose work is comparable in importance to that of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. His writings on money, metropolises, and modernity have inspired generations of thinkers for over a century. In this book, leading expert Thomas Kemple clearly and accessibly introduces Simmel’s sociological and philosophical work, ranging from his masterpiece The Philosophy of Money to his famous essays ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ and (...) ‘Fashion’ and beyond. The author situates his writings within his social and intellectual circles and analyses them in light of current debates surrounding urban sociology and social networks, phenomenology and metaphysics, cultural criticism and the study of everyday life. He brings Simmel’s most famous works into conversation with others that have received less attention, such as his writings on nature, art, religion, and sexuality. Through diagrams, everyday examples, and expositions of the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, and successors, this highly readable book captures the innovative spirit of Simmel’s unique method of thinking about cultural objects and his original style of writing about social life. Commemorating the 100th anniversary of Simmel’s death, it will be the leading guide to Simmel’s thought for generations of students and scholars. (shrink)

A consideration of the full dimensions of humanism and of the humanist dimension of law invites two questions: is “humanism” compatible with theocentric religion, and therefore, is the Renaissance compatible with the “otherworldly” Middle Ages, and, has law any humanist dimension at all? The answer to the first question provides the insights that answer the second. Fully integrated humanism includes bath the Classical immanence of humanity in the world and the value accorded to the human being by the declaration in (...) Genesis that all creation is “very good”, a principle reinforced by the Incarnation of the Logos as a man. Understood in the full range of its human relevance, from the quotidian to the transcendent, law too bas a humanist dimension. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues by Angela McKay KnobelThomas M. Osborne Jr.KNOBEL, Angela McKay. Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021. 214 pp. Cloth, $65.00This book is the first substantial English monograph on Aquinas's account of the infused virtues in many years, and the most significant treatment of the issue since Gabriel Bullet, Vertus morales infuses et vertus morales (...) acquises selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1958). The infused virtues are about, or they are intrinsically ordered to, the supernatural end of human beings. Aquinas was among the first to argue that the infused virtues include not only the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, but also supernatural counterparts to the acquired virtues, which are proportionate to the natural end of humans. These infused moral virtues are infused with charity and lost with mortal sin. Aquinas never addressed at length the relationship between acquired [End Page 144] and infused moral virtues, and many theologians rejected Aquinas's position that there are infused moral virtues.Knobel's book has two parts. The first part of the book consists of three chapters about Aquinas's own views. Chapter 1 is on natural virtue, which can be acquired through the agent's own efforts. Knobel emphasizes the way in which this virtue is proportionate to the natural end and abilities of humans. She correctly notes that Aquinas thinks that humans can perform such virtuous acts without grace. However, since she does not distinguish between morally good acts and morally good agents, she does not adequately address Aquinas's view of how sinners without grace might possess acquired virtue. Additionally, although she correctly notes the way in which moral virtue orders the agent to the end, it is often unclear whether she is discussing the proximate end of the will (which is an object), a further end (as when someone steals to commit adultery), or the ultimate end (which is God as the object of charity or the self as an object of disordered love). For example, she writes, "[I]f an act is not sinful, it cannot be ordered to an evil end." She might be making the uncontroversial claim that good acts are made evil when directed to a bad end, but in her argument she seems to be making the stronger claim that someone with a disordered ultimate end cannot habitually order good acts to such an end.Chapter 2 is on the infused virtues. Knobel notes that for Aquinas synderesis, which is a habit of grasping first practical principles, is a seed of the natural virtues, and that faith, which grasps revealed principles, plays this role in infused virtue. She shows how infused moral virtues, which share the same matter as the acquired moral virtues, have different ends and rules than the acquired virtues. Chapter 3 concerns Aquinas's account of the relationship between the acquired and infused virtues, and in particular the infused moral virtues. Knobel draws attention to texts in which Aquinas argues that the two coexist in someone who has grace, but she states that this coexistence is contradicted in the discussion of Macrobius's fourfold division of virtue in the Summa Theologiae (I-II, q. 61, a. 5). In this article, she thinks, acquired virtue is political virtue, and a stage toward infused virtue. She does not address how Aquinas uses the term "political virtue" differently in different texts, and how the schema of four virtues in this text might be read as describing both four stages of acquired virtue and four stages of infused virtue. Knobel supports her view—that those with grace lack acquired virtue—by claiming that Aquinas consistently states that there is no acquired virtue in heaven. This view only tenuously (at best) supports her point that acquired virtue does not exist in this life among those in a state of grace. Moreover, Aquinas seems to suggest that acquired virtue persists in the next life in ST I-II, q. 67, a. 1-2.The second part of the book is a criticism of contemporary interpretations of Aquinas, and an exposition of... (shrink)

Anthropology is turning toward a new engagement with acentral question of Weber: how do people come to understand the distributionof fortune in the world? Our discipline’s recent examination ofthe uses of the past prompts us to ask how stances toward the future areboth the product of cultural logics and the target of institutional interests.In this article, I trace the engagement with contingency in anthropologyand social thought, and then compare the nonchalant stance toward thefuture found in Greek society with the different (...) disposition of individualgaming mastery in the digital domain, such as in Second Life, but alsoin the longest-running Greek state-sponsored game: Pro-Po. These examplesillustrate how games are increasingly the sites for institutional effortsboth to appropriate creativity and to generate distinctive subjectivities. (shrink)

Despite the popularity of research on intrapersonal communication across many disciplines, there has been little attention devoted to the factors that might account for individual differences in talking to oneself. In this paper, I explore two possible explanations for who people might differ in the frequency of their self-talk. According to the “social isolation” hypothesis, spending more time alone or having socially-isolating experiences will be associated with increased self-talk. According to the “cognitive disruption” hypothesis, having self-related experiences that are cognitively (...) disruptive will be associated with increased self-talk frequency. Several studies using the Self-Talk Scale (Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009) are pertinent to these hypotheses. Results indicate moderate support for the social isolation hypothesis and strong support for the cognitive disruption hypothesis. I conclude the paper with a wide range of implications for future research on individual differences in self-talk and other kinds of intrapersonal communication. (shrink)

This book argues that Plato's Charmides presents a unitary but incomplete argument intended to lead its readers to substantive philosophical insights.

Although previous ethical analyses of management buyouts have presented useful insights, they have been flawed in three major ways. First, they define the transaction too narrowly, emphasizing the going private aspect and ignoring the leveraged aspect. Leveraging alters the nature of the transaction substantially and warrants additional ethical analysis. Second, these previous analyses ignore the impact of buyouts on non-stockholder constituents of the firm, an omission which renders their implicit utilitarian approach incomplete. Third, these analyses do not include Rawlsian, libertarian, (...) or Kantian perspectives on ethics. This paper addresses these shortcomings and finds the ethical status of leveraged management buyouts to be highly suspect. (shrink)

This volume comprises essays presented to Alvin Plantinga on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

: Given Descartes's conception of extension, space and body, there are deep problems about how there can be any real motion. The argument here is that in fact Descartes takes motion to be only phenomenal. The paper sets out the problems generated by taking motion to be real, the solution to them found in the Cartesian texts, and an explanation of those texts in which Descartes appears on the contrary to regard motion as real.

i began my “eleatic descartes” with a reminder of, what nobody denies, that Descartes is a convinced mechanist. Therefore, he must, in some sense, recognize motion. No less widely accepted is that Descartes is a plenum theorist. The main argument of the Eleatic interpretation is that given his articulation of the corporeal plenum in part two of the Principles, he cannot recognize motion by conceiving of it as real. And, because motion is what individuates bodies, there cannot be a multiplicity (...) of real bodies. Thus, as far as the material world is concerned, the two Eleatic elements are in place: as for Parmenides, so for Descartes, there is but one thing, and it does not change.For Descartes, that one thing.. (shrink)

In the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, art. 4, Thomas argues that the good has the ratio of the final cause.1 This thesis is problematic because there seems to be a difference between the definitions and uses of “good” and “final cause.” If Thomas is arguing that the good and the final cause are in no way distinct, then why might we plausibly describe something as good even if it has no causal role? If not, then what does (...) it mean for the ratio of goodness to be the same as that of final causality? Later Thomists disagree over the precise relationship between goodness and final causality, and their disagreement is reflected in their different interpretations of the argument and conclusion of this text. Few hold that Thomas merely means to say that goodness is the fundament of being an end, or that being an end is something like a proper passion of goodness. But they disagree over what the additional connection between the two might be. (shrink)

Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons’ attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism _implicitly_. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects’ metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk’s implicit metaethical commitments. We present results (...) of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate. (shrink)

growing up in new mexico, I was passionate about geology, specifically paleontology. It led, in one adventure, to me being arrested by monks. While on a picnic with my parents at Jemez Springs, I had followed a beautiful Permian stratum, rich with crinoids and brachiopod shells, onto private land owned by The Servants of the Paraclete, a retreat for "whiskey priests."1 I was detained while one brother admonished me, kindly, and let me go, and even let me keep my specimens. (...) But the passion for the history of the earth and natural history in general remained. I was one of those kids who came late to the idea that what was taught at school and what I found of interest had any points of intersection, but I did come to... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Two Philosophical Impulses Substance The Empiricists on Substance Descartes on Substance Spinoza on Attribute The Subjective Interpretation The Objective Interpretation Gueroult OI and SI Descartes and Spinoza.

Descartes’s View of the Will Has generally been found problematic and unsatisfactory, especially by those who have read it, or elements of it, in libertarian terms. Attempts to repair the theory, even by sympathetic interpreters, seem only to have aggravated the view’s putative shortcomings—again, especially among those who have read it, or part of it, in libertarian terms—which suggests that the libertarian reading itself might be unsatisfactory. The aim of this paper is to show that the linchpin text on which (...) libertarian readings have been based provides no basis for such readings. The text is the so-called letter to the Jesuit Denis Mesland of 9 February 1645. Among seminal authors—those most .. (shrink)

A critical but sympathetic treatment of Pierre Bayle.

This sense of attributability, or internality, is the quarry in many of Frankfurt's articles, and it has proved to be an elusive one. In this paper I want to explore, in a tentative fashion, the question of why we should be interested in finding this quarry. It seems to me that there are at least two quite distinct kinds of reason for this concern, and that when they are distinguished the problem may look less difficult than it has seemed.

One of the most curious events in Othello is the titular character’s epileptic fit, which does not appear in the story by Cinthio that is the accepted source of the play’s plot. Why does Shakespeare invent such an incident? The easiest direction to take is the equation of epilepsy with demonic possession, a common belief in the early modern period. In this essay, however, I argue from textual and critical evidence for a philosophical interpretation of Othello’s epilepsy: namely, that his (...) seizure, particularly in relation to the play’s conflict of reason and emotion, can be seen as a challenge to early modern orthodoxy concerning the mind-body problem, in that it conflates the distinction between body and soul. (shrink)